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ABSTRACT
TRUST MANAGEMENT SCHEMES FOR PEER-TO-PEER
NETWORKS
by
Lin Cai
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networking enables users with similar interests to exchange, or
obtain les. This network model has been proven popular to exchange music,
pictures, or software applications. These les are saved, and most likely executed,
at the downloading host. At the expense of this mechanism, worms, viruses, and
malware nd an open front door to the downloading host and gives them a convenient
environment for successful proliferation throughout the network. Although virus
detection software is currently available, this countermeasure works in a reactive
fashion, and in most times, in an isolated manner. A trust management scheme is
considered to contain the proliferation of viruses in P2P networks. Specically, a
cooperative and distributed trust management scheme based on a two-layer approach
to bound the proliferation of viruses is proposed. The new scheme is called
double-layer dynamic trust (DDT) management scheme. The results show that the
proposed scheme bounds the proliferation of malware. With the proposed scheme,
the number of infected hosts and the proliferation rate are limited to small values. In
addition, it is shown that network activity is not discouraged by using the proposed
scheme. Moreover, to improve the eciency on the calculation of trust values of ratio
based normalization models, a model is proposed for trust value calculation using a
three-dimensional normalization to represent peer activity with more accuracy than
that of a conventional ratio based normalization.
Distributed network security is also considered, especially in P2P network
security. For many P2P systems, including ad hoc networks and online markets,
reputation systems have been considered as a solution for mitigating the aects of
malicious peers. However, a sybil attack, wherein forging identities is performed to
unfairly and arbitrarily inuence the reputation of peers in a network or community.
To defend against sybil attack, each reported transaction, which is used to calculate
trust values, is veried.
In this thesis, it is shown that peer reputation alone cannot bound network
subversion of a sybil attack. Therefore, a new trust management framework, called
Sybildefense, is introduced. This framework combines a trust management scheme
with a cryptography mechanism to verify dierent transaction claims issue by peers,
including those bogus claims of sybil peers. To improve the eciency on the
identication of honest peers from sybil peers, a k-means clustering mechanism is
adopted. Moreover, to include a list of peer's trustees in a warning messages is
proposed to generate a local table for a peer that it is used to identify possible
clusters of sybil peers. The defensive performance of these algorithms are compared
under sybil attacks. The performance results show that the proposed framework
(Sybildefense) can thwart sybil attacks eciently.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the simplest service model of a connection between two internet hosts is
the one used in peer-to-peer (P2P) networking, where a host can perform as a client
or server of information, depending on his interests and role in a network. Current
models in the Internet denes the provider of a service as a host which is used almost
exclusively as a server for technical and economical reasons, making the host able
to handle a large number of requests as a centralized entity. This allows to localize
resources and making the investment a feasible one.
In P2P networks, all peers are able to provide resources, including bandwidth,
storage space, and computing power, in a cooperative manner. As peers are added
to the network the demand for system resources and services may increase the
total system capacity, improving scalability. P2P networks have the potential of
converting any host to a source of information and of to allow the dissemination of
information without the limitations of using a single (host) interface. The use of
P2P for content distribution is currently under the consideration as a substrate for
massive applications such as e-commerce [1]-[3] and IPTV [4]-[5], where video sources
can rely on intermediate peers for further distribution of content. The potential
of these distribution content systems has been demonstrated by some distribution
networks for le sharing [6], [7, 8].
To scale up P2P networks, it is important that all clients provide resources,
including bandwidth, storage space, and computing power. Thus, as peers arrive and
the demand on the system increases, the total capacity of the system also increases.
This is not always true for a client-server architecture with a xed set of servers, in
which adding more clients could mean slower data transfers for all users.
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Figure 1.1 Peer to Peer network.
The P2P network consists of numerous participating peers as network peers.
There are connecting links between any two peers who know each other: i.e. if a
participating peer knows another peer in the P2P network, then there is a directed
edge from the former peer to the latter in the overlay network.
The primary advantage of a P2P approach is that it leverages the resources of
the many peers to provide the overall application and network services rather than
relying on the resources of one or more central servers thus preventing those central
servers from becoming a bottleneck for the entire network. A secondary advantage
of a P2P approach is that there is no single central authority that can be blocked
or removed and cause the collapse of the whole P2P network; this provides fault
tolerance and robustness quality that may be desired for various reasons.
1.1 Peer-to-Peer Network Architectures
P2P networking has generated tremendous interest worldwide among both Internet
surfers and computer networking professionals. P2P software systems like Kazaa and
Napster rank amongst the most popular software applications. The original MP3
le sharing system, Napster [6] became the world's most popular Internet software
3application literally overnight. Napster [6] typied a new P2P system dened above:
a simple user interface running outside of the browser supporting both le serving
and downloads. Most Napster user migrated to the Kazaa and Kazaa Lite software
applications, and to the FastTrack network. FastTrack grew to become even larger
than the original Napster network. Kazaa has suered from its own legal troubles,
but various other systems, like eDonkey, have continued the legacy of free P2P le
sharing software. Based on how peers in an overlay network are linked to each other,
the P2P networks are classied as structured or unstructured.
1.1.1 Unstructured P2P Network
An unstructured P2P network is formed when the overlay links are established
arbitrarily. Such networks can be easily constructed as a new peer that wants to
join the network can copy existing links of another peer and then form its own links
over time. In an unstructured P2P network, if a peer wants to nd a desired piece of
data in the network, the query has to be ooded through the network to nd as many
peers as possible that share the data. The main disadvantage with such networks is
that the queries may not always be resolved. Popular content is likely to be available
at several peers and any peer searching for it is likely to nd the same thing. But if a
peer is looking for rare data shared by only a few other peers, then it is highly unlikely
that search will be successful. Since there is no correlation between a peer and the
content managed by it, there is no guarantee that ooding nds a peer that has the
desired data. Flooding also causes a high amount of signaling trac in the network,
which results in very poor search eciency. Most of the popular P2P networks are
unstructured.
In unstructured networks (such as Gnutella), the placement of data (les) is
completely unrelated to the overlay topology. Since there is no information about
which peers are likely to have the relevant les, searching essentially amounts to
4perform a random search, in which various peers are probed and asked if they have
any les matching the query. Unstructured P2P networks dier in the way in which
they construct the overlay topology and distribute queries from peer to peer. The
advantage of such systems is that they can easily accommodate a highly dynamic
peer population.
1.1.2 Structured P2P Network
Structured P2P networks employ a protocol to ensure that any peer can eciently
route a search to some other peer that has the desired le, even if the le is hard to
nd. Such a guarantee necessitates a more structured pattern of overlay links. By
far the most common type of structured P2P network is the distributed hash table
(DHT) [11, 12], in which a variant of consistent hashing is used to assign ownership
of each le to a particular peer, in a way analogous to a traditional hash table's
assignment of each key to a particular array slot [9, 10].
Structured networks, (such as Chord, CAN, PAST, and Tapestry) have emerged
mainly in an attempt to address the scalability issues faced by unstructured systems.
The random search methods adopted by unstructured systems seem to be inherently
unscalable, and structured systems were proposed, in which the overlay network
topology is tightly controlled and les (or pointers to them) are placed at precisely
specied locations. These systems provide a mapping between the le identier and
location, in the form of a distributed routing table, so that queries can be eciently
routed to the peer with the desired le. Structured systems oer a scalable solution
for exact-match queries, i.e., queries in which the complete identier of the requested
data object is known (as compared to keyword queries). There are ways to use exact
exact-match queries as a substrate for keyword queries, however, it is not clear how
scalable these techniques can be in a distributed environment. The disadvantage of
5structured systems is that it is hard to maintain the structure required for routing in
a very dynamic peer population, in which peers are joining and leaving at high rates.
1.2 Peer-to-Peer Network Threats
Attacks of P2P le sharing networks can be performed in many dierent ways and all
may aim to harm the host computer or some other resources. The open access to these
systems makes peers vulnerable to malicious users who can aect data or services to
exploit them for personal or commercial gain [18]. Moreover, malicious users may take
advantage of the advertisement of popular downloads that potentially encourage users
to retrieve les and explore them, creating an incubating environment of malware.
P2P le sharing networks can be attacked by spamming, spoong, and identity theft.
In the following sections, three attacks are introduced, virus proliferation, multiple
identities, and spyware.
1.2.1 Virus Proliferation
Several interesting studies about virus proliferation have been presented in the
literature [13]-[16], [9, 38]. They consider a network topology and features that
describe the proliferation prole of a specic virus. Among other properties, viruses
tend to increase their spreading rate in highly dense networks. Attacks of P2P le
sharing networks can include many dierent types of viruses. The viruses can attach
les on the network and begin to be downloaded to computers all over without anyone
being aware of it. Viruses can harm networks and make them to run slowly or to
shut down. If the virus is downloaded into other people's computers unknowingly,
that virus can spread around their computer and cause major damage. Once in your
computer, the virus attacks other les and goes out in emails, attacking other people's
computers. Viruses or malware have usually a specic destructive objective, whether
they aim to the host computer, to retrieve nancial information that can be illegally
6protable, or to aect communication resources (e.g. denial of service). Attacks on
P2P le sharing networks by virus can become frequent and they can be very costly.
A popular countermeasure against malware in a host is the use of an anti-virus
application, which task can be coarsely divided into detecting a computing threat
and removing it from the host. Installing virus protection on a host helps to ward o
some of the problems associated with virus attacks. The successful detection by this
protection software is based on the knowledge of hazardous les or software and their
properties or signature for identication. Therefore, a new virus can be unnoticeable
hosted in a peer until the detection program is updated for its identication. During
this detection delay, the virus could be downloaded by another peer. Furthermore,
after a virus is detected in a downloaded le by a peer, the detection software may
remove the threat but this information is kept from other peers as it may be considered
information of only local signicance. Trust management schemes are a promising
technology to detect misbehavior and suppress malware propagation in P2P networks
[17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23].
1.2.2 Spyware and Identity Theft
Spyware, and adware are also common attacks of P2P le sharing networks. Spyware
and adware are much like a virus but they attach themselves to the software
downloaded in P2P le sharing networks. Spyware or adware tracks visited websites
and makes a web browser run slower and cause antivirus software and rewalls not
to function properly.
Spyware and adware can be dicult to delete o a host and can remain even
after the original software is deleted. Spyware or adware can compromise user's
privacy or security on the Internet by tracking website visits leaving the host open to
attacks from P2P le sharing networks.
7Attacks on P2P le sharing network can also be performed by spamming and
spoong. Spamming is when users of the P2P le sharing network get unsolicited
information. This can be any type of information unsolicited but received you keep
getting. Spamming can slow down a host and the P2P networks. Spoong attacks
on a P2P le sharing network includes downloading les that are not as they were
described. The actual le could be illegal or questionable material. Spoong may not
do a lot of harm to a host but it does waste user's time and resources. It can become
aggravating to download les that are not correct and this can become a problem for
the P2P network itself if other people leave the network.
1.2.3 Sybil Attack
In the Sybil attack, a malicious peer impersonates a larger number of peers by using
stolen and/or non-existing identities. For example, in an online environment, new
identities may be created with minimal cost, so that users are not tied to unique
identiers. Therefore, a single user may create enough Sybils [24]. The Sybil
peers can use multiple identities to falsely vouch for other Sybils, or to support an
identity that would otherwise gain a bad reputation. This attack is a powerful way
to get more benets from a cooperative system than other users, without actually
contributing to the networked community. Hence, Sybil attack can easily defeat
trust-based management schemes. Each of the defenses against Sybil attack has
dierent tradeos. Most defenses are not capable of defending against every type of
Sybil attack [24, 25, 26, 27, 28].
Synchronous reputation system is vulnerable to Sybil attack [29, 30, 32]. An
attacker that wishes to increase its reputation simply uses Sybil identities to create
a copy of the existing graph representing trust relationships. The original peers
cannot be distinguished from the impersonated peers. Thus, some Sybil peer has
reputations equal or better to any original peer and the system will be subverted in
8the end. Asynchronous reputation system is more robust to Sybil attacks, since no
Sybil attacker can create a duplicate global graph as explained above in the symmetric
case. For example, in [33], a social network is used as the central authority. A node
trusts its neighbors. Each node learns about the network from its neighbors. It use
randomized routes (a variant of random walks) on a social network topology in order
to reject sybils.
When there are Sybil attacks in the network, peer reputation may not be enough
to limit their proliferation because the reputation system is the one under attack.
A cryptography-based trust management scheme is proposed in this thesis named
SybilDefense.
1.3 Trust Management Schemes
Attacks of P2P le sharing networks are common and can be found with almost
any computer applications. Trust management systems have been developed to
enhance system security and to suppress malicious peers in various scenarios, such
as distributed computing, agent technology [19, 21], GRID computing [35, 36],
Ad-hoc networks[37, 38, 39], and component software [22, 23], among others. Trust
management can help minimize risk and ensure the network activity of benign entities
in distributed systems. In addition to use a level of trust for each peer, participants of
P2P networks can distribution of trust information about peers in dierent networks
scenarios to decrease the degree of eect of misbehaving hosts [95]-[91] in combination
with trust management schemes. Trust information about peers can be built through
evaluation of the interaction history of peers [95, 91]. Moreover, trust-based incentive
schemes can potentially discourage free-riders and selsh peers by only oering
services to cooperative peers [18].
Several of the trust management schemes in P2P network that have been
described in the literature can be broadly categorized as globalized (Synchronous
9reputation system) or localized schemes (Asynchronous reputation system). This
categorization is based upon the approach adopted to evaluate and calculate trust
value of the peers. In globalized schemes, the trust value is calculated (or
partly calculated) and assigned to each peer by the trust management system
[20, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46]. In [20], the trust value assigned to a trust relationship
is a function of the combination of the peer's global reputation and the evaluating
peer's perception of that peer. While in localized schemes, each peer computes the
trust value by itself according to its local history statistics [17],[18].
Globalized management schemes are complex since the schemes need to assign
trust value to each peer by collecting statistics and computing a global rating over a
long period of time. Recently, a few localized trust management systems have been
proposed for supporting trusted collaborations and suppress malware propagation
[18, 17]. The scheme in [18] calculates the trust value by getting votes from all peers.
For a large scale P2P network, it may be complex to collect votes from the majority of
the peers due to practical network constraints of each anticipated peer. The scheme
in [17] is based on localized trust evaluation and in warning dissemination to prevent
others from downloading a le from a suspicious peer. The scheme aims to limit the
proliferation of malware under the assumption that there is no local le infection. In
other words, when a malware-free peer downloads a le containing malware, other
existing les in the peer are not infected. However, viruses not only could specically
attempt to spread themselves but also infect the other les within the P2P network
or pursue further hardware and software damage at the host of network level.
When a network entity establishes trust in other network entities, it can predict
the future behaviors of others and diagnose their security properties. This prediction
and diagnosis can fully or partially solve the following four important problems.
Assistance in decision making to improve security and robustness. With a prediction
of the behaviors of other entities, a network entity can avoid collaborating with
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untrustworthy entities, which can greatly reduce the chances of being attacked. For
example, a peer can choose the most trustworthy route to deliver its packets in a P2P
network.
The prediction of peers' future behavior directly determines the risk faced by
the network. Given the risk, the network can adapt its operation accordingly. For
example, stronger security mechanisms should be employed when the risk is high.
Trust evaluation leads to a natural security policy that network participants with
low trust values should be investigated or eliminated. Thus, trust information can
be used to detect misbehaving network entities. Moreover, with the assessment
of trustworthiness of individual network entities, it is possible to evaluate the
trustworthiness of the entire network. For example, the distribution of the trust
values of network entities can be used to represent the healthiness of the network.
Trust-management engines avoid the need to resolve identities in an
authorization decision [47, 48, 49, 50, 51]. Instead, they express privileges and
restrictions in a programming language. This allows for increased exibility and
expressibility, as well as standardization of modern, scalable security mechanisms.
Further advantages of the trust-management approach include proofs that requested
transactions comply with local policies and system architectures that encourage
developers and administrators to consider an application's security policy carefully
and specify it explicitly [56, 57, 83, 67, 72, 89].
1.4 Motivation and Objects
The security of distributed network is considered since numerous businesses and
Web sites have promoted \peer to peer" technology as the future of Internet
networking. P2P networking has the potential of providing wide channels for
information exchange, especially in the form of les. At the same time, P2P
networking is prone to the proliferation of viruses. Although malware detection
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software is currently available, this countermeasure works in a reactive approach and,
in most cases, isolated manner.
Trust management is a promising proactive mechanism to prevent virus
dissemination. Current trust models use peer reputation for this purpose. However,
when viruses have infectious properties, peer reputation may not be enough to
limit their proliferation. Moreover, peer reputation alone cannot bound epidemics
eciently in an infectious environment. A trust management algorithm is proposed
in this thesis which uses the combination of trust values of peers and infection values
of both peers and content to bound the proliferation of viruses in P2P networks. The
simulation results show that the proposed trust management scheme can bound virus
proliferation to a small number of peers, without inhibiting le-download activity.
The inuence of the propagation delay on the system performance is analyzed and
observed, such as how delayed alerts benet network infection as informed peers
cannot prevent clean peers from downloading les from infected peers in a timely
fashion.
A Sybil adversary creates a large amount of cheep peers or pseudonyms (Sybils)
that act in the systems as separate entities, vouching for each other if necessary to
fool the reputation system. By masquerading and presenting multiple identities, the
adversary can control the network substantially. The Sybil Attack is a powerful way
to get more benets from a cooperative system than other users, without contributing
the corresponding work.
In this thesis, a SybilDefense is presented and illustrated. How a Sybil attack
can signicantly impact the reputation system of the P2P network is introduced.
Then the problem is abstracted theoretically and the necessary conditions to prevent
the Sybil attack are pointed out. Finally, a simulation is built under the architecture
of distributed P2P network. The results show that SybilDefense framework is eective
and ecient in defending Sybil attacks.
CHAPTER 2
RATIO-BASED DOUBLE-LAYER DYNAMIC TRUST
MANAGEMENT SCHEME
Trust management schemes aim to distribute reputation information about peers in
dierent networks scenarios to categorize the behavior and contribution of hosts to
the P2P community [95]-[91]. A dynamic trust management scheme was proposed
[17]. This scheme is based on localized trust evaluations and in dissemination of alert
messages to prevent others peers from downloading a le from a suspicious peer. The
scheme aims to limit the proliferation of malware under the assumption that there
is no local le infection. In other words, when a virus-free peer downloads a le
containing a virus, other existing les in the peer are not infected. However, viruses
not only attempt to spread themselves but also to infect other les in the host, or to
pursue further hardware and software damage at the host or network level. Although
the authors didn't assign a name to the scheme in the paper, this scheme is called
dynamic threshold management (DTM) in the remainder of this paper, for brevity.
In this paper, the performance of DTM under le infection is discussed
and it is shown that le infection has the potential to underscore proliferation
countermeasures. To bound virus proliferation, the double-layer dynamic trust (DDT)
management scheme is proposed, which uses a two-layer trusting strategy aimed to
contain the impact of the internal infection. The results show that the proposed
trust management scheme is ecient for bounding the dissemination of viruses in
P2P networks under viruses with infectious properties. The proposed scheme uses a
rating messaging scheme, used to advertise the undergone experience of a peer after a
download. The eect of the propagation delay on the system performance is analyzed,
and observed how delayed alerts benet network infection as informed peers cannot
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prevent clean peers from downloading les from infected peers in a timely fashion.
Furthermore, it is shown that the adoption of the proposed scheme has a negligible
the impact on the downloaded activity by peers.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the
proposed scheme based on dynamic trust management, the terms and the parameters
for evaluation of peer trust, and the operation of the proposed management scheme
in a P2P network. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical analysis of the number of
infection peers under dierent trust management schemes. Section 2.3 presents a
performance study of the proposed scheme, obtained through computer simulation.
Section 4.6 presents the conclusions.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networking is used by users with similar interests to
exchange, contribute, or simply acquire data or information. These computer les
(whether music, pictures, or software applications) are saved, and most likely executed
at the downloading host. Worms, viruses and intrusion les nd an open door in P2P
networks, giving place to a very convenient environment for a successful proliferation
throughout the network. Although malware detection software is currently available,
this countermeasure works in a reactive approach and, in most cases, isolated manner.
In this chapter, a proactive approach of trust management to contain the proliferation
of malware in P2P networks is considered. Specically, a cooperative and distributed
trust management system is proposed to bound the proliferation of malware.
2.1 Trust Model in Peer-to-Peer Network
In the two-layer approach of the DDT scheme, each peer has a trust table that keeps
two main parameters. The rst parameter, similarly to that used in DTM, is a trust
value about the other peers. A trust value at peer A about peer B indicates the
probability that a virus is downloaded from B by peer A. The higher the trust A has
on B, the smaller the probability.
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Any peer in the system that is trusted by any other peer is called trustee and
any peer that trusts a trustee is called truster. The second trust value in this table
is designed to prevent internal infection, which is dened as the action of an infected
le or malware that infects other les in a host by using this host as a means of
local proliferation. This trust value is called the infectious value. The infectious
value at peer A about peer B indicates the probability of internal infection from a
le downloaded. The larger the infectious value is, the higher the probability of an
infection from virus downloaded from B. This means that peer A would less likely to
download a le from B.
The following is an example of how the proposed algorithm works. Consider
that peer A wants a le and there are three possible trusters B, C, and D who have the
desired le. Figure 2.1 shows this example. The black square in the Figure represents
the requested le, the red square in peer B represents a virus, which has infected
the other les in peer B with probability PI . In the DTM scheme, peer A chooses
the peer that has the highest trust value at A. Peer A then chooses peer B as the
downloading source. In the proposed scheme, the higher the infectious value is, the
larger the probability that an infection has occurred in the corresponding peer. Peer
A then chooses a peer with the smallest infectious value from its eligible trustees. In
this example, peer A selects peer D as the downloading source because D's infectious
value is 0, which is the smallest among B, C, and D. In this way, the system guarantees
that a peer performs a download from the cleanest source. Dierent from another
schemes, it is considered that a le can be infected by a le stored in the same peer.
For example, as this Figure shows, peer B has an infected le, which is dierent from
the one requested by A. Therefore, if peer A had selected the sought le from peer
B, this le may have been infected and all the les at peer A may become infected in
turn.
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Figure 2.1 Example of the proposed scheme using a double-layer trust management
As another example, consider that peer A wants a le and none of its three
trusters, B, C, and D, has that le, as Figure 2.2 shows. Peer B, C, and D forward
the search request message to their trusters, consequently. Figure 2.2 shows that peer
A nds the searched le in peers E and F, the grey colored ones. Peer A calculates
the trust values on these two peers, which are Tv(A;B)  Tv(B;E) = 0:48 and
Tv(A;C)  Tv(C;F ) = 0:3. In the DTM scheme, peer A chooses the peer that has
the largest trust value. Peer A then chooses peer E as the downloading source. In the
proposed scheme, the larger the infectious value is, the larger the probability that an
infection has occurred in the corresponding peer. Peer A then chooses the peer with
the smallest infectious value from its possible trustees. The infectious value of peer E
and F separately are Iv(A;B) + Iv(B;E) = 3 and Iv(A;C) + Iv(C;F ) = 1. In this
example, peer A selects peer F as the downloading source since its Iv is lower than
that of peer E.
As Figure 2.3 shows, peer A downloads the le from peer F. When the
downloading is nished, peer A checks whether or not the downloaded le has a
16
A
G
E
D
B
Truster
Truster
File search request
C
F
Truster
Trust table at Peer A
Trust table at Peer B
Trust table at Peer C
Peer Trust
value
Infectious
value
B
C
Peer Trust
value
Infectious
value
E
Peer Trust
value
Infectious
value
F
0.8 2
0.6 1
0.6 1
0.5 0 File search response
Figure 2.2 File search mechanism, from a peer to its trusters. Trusters forward the
search request to their own trusters.
virus. If peer A is not satised with the download, it sends a warning message to its
trustees as shown in Figure 2.4. When the trustees receive the message, they update
their trust value and infectious value about peer E, and they forward the message to
their trustees until the time stamp expires.
2.1.1 Trust Model
In the proposed trust management scheme, there are N peers, where each peer has
a trust table with 2  (N   1) entries. The trust value and the infectious value in
the trust table are used to select the downloading source. The trust model has the
following major components:
 Trust table. The trust table in peer i is denoted as T (i). The trust value of
peer i on peer j, is denoted as Tv(i; j), where Tv(i; j) 2 [ 1; 1]. For example,
Tv(i; j) =  1 means that peer i does not trust peer j and any led downloaded
from j would be expected to be a virus with probability 1.0. On the other hand
Tv(i; j) = 1 means that peer i trusts peer j and any le downloaded from j is
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Figure 2.3 File download mechanism, from the downloading source to the le
requesting peer.
expected to be innocuous with probability 1.0. Therefore, in the selection of
the downloading source, peer j has the top priority to become the downloading
source. Peer i updates its trust table after downloading a le from peer j
by re-evaluating the trust and infectious values about peer j according to the
experienced interactions with peer j, and these are represented as the ratio of
downloads of clean les and all downloads from peer j. It is dened social
distance as the number of peers that a message would traverse to reach a given
peer. For example, if a peer forwards a le search request from a truster to its
trustee, the social distance that the request travels is two.
 Infectious value. The second value in T (i) is the infectious value Iv that
represents the possible internal infection degree of peer j. The larger the value
of Iv, the larger the probability that peer contains virus. If there are several
trustees whose trust value is larger than the threshold for an acceptable trust
value, the peer with the smallest Iv is selected as the downloading source. Peer
i updates T (i) if it receives an alert from its trustee, peer j.
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 Antivirus software. In this paper, it is considered that a peer has virus-
detection software available. A successful virus detection indicates that a peer
has downloaded an infected le, and the antivirus software can identify the le.
Therefore, peer i detects a virus with probability Pd(i).
 Internal infection. If a clean peer (whose les are virus free), downloads a
le containing viruses, other existing les in this peer can possibly get infected
with probability PI . An infected download is dened as a download of a le
containing a virus.
 Propagation delay. The propagation delay is the time it takes to download a
le or the time that a ranking message takes to travel from one peer to another.
The units of the propagation time in this dissertation a xed period of time,
called time slot. In this paper, it is assumed that a download takes a time slot.
Also, it is assumed that the time that takes for a ranking message to be sent
to a peer is one time slot. The propagation delay between peer i and peer j is
denoted as d(i; j).
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2.1.2 Management Scheme
The trust management scheme works as follows. When peer i searches for le f , it
checks the local le's reputation in the le record. If the le's reputation value is
found at the database and is above the acceptable reputation threshold, ThR, then
the peer proceeds to nd the le source.
The values held by a peer are updated after dierent actions take place. These
are described as follows.
File Search. A peer i sends a request for le f to all trustees whose trust value
is above the admissible threshold value ThT (i.e., trustable trustees). Peer i chooses
the peer that has the largest Tv and the lowest infectious value among those who
have a copy of the requested le. If the le is not available from peer i's trustable
trustees, the peer sends a recursive query for f to all trustees. In this query, the
receiving trustee searches for the requested le among its own trustees. This process
is performed recursively until either a fruitful search is achieved or there are no more
trustees to query. After a recursive query, if peer k is introduced to i, new values are
calculated: Tv(i; k) = Tv(i; j)T (j; k), and Iv(i; k) = Iv(i; j)+ Iv(j; k), then the peer
proceeds to the selection of a downloading source.
Post-download update. If the download of f is determined to be clean, Tv(i; j) =
Tv(i; j), where  is the rate of the trust value growth,  > 1, while Iv(i; j) remains
unchanged. If the download of f is determined infected:
Tv(i; j) = Tv(i; j)
Iv(i; j) = Iv(i; j) + 1
F (i; fl) = F (i; fl) + 1
where  is the rate of the trust value degradation and 1 >  > 0. During this phase,
if Tv(i; j) < thw, where thw is the threshold to trigger a warning process, peer i
issues warning messages to all its trusters. In this way, peers exchange only critical
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information about other interacting peers. A warning message has the following
format: fID; vj; fm;; dg, where ID is the warning identication number, vj is the
identication of the peer that served as the source of a threatening le, fm is the le's
name,  indicates the decrement of the trust value at peer i, and d is the maximum
number of truster hops the warning message is allowed to propagate.
Post-warning updates. After receiving a warning message from peer k about peer
j, peer i updates the trust values. If Tv(i; k) > ThT :
Tv(i; j) = Tv(i; j) Tv(i; j)
Iv(i; j) = Iv(i; j) +
(d  1)
d
F (i; fl) = F (i; fl) +
(d  1)
d
 = 
d  1
d
:
Because the forwarding of the warning message is bound by d, this value is also
updated as d = d   1. If the updated d > 1 and Tv(k; i) > thw, peer i sends a
warning message to its trusters with the updated values.
2.2 Analysis
Probability is used to analyze proliferation of malware over a P2P network and a
recursive formula is developed to calculate the number of infected peers in the P2P
network.
Consider a distributed trust management system with n legitimate peers and
m infected peers uniformly distributed in the network. Each legitimate peer has v
trusters in average. Total number of peers in the network is n+m. Let I(t) represent
the number of infected peers in the P2P network at time t. Therefore, I(0) = m.
Let H(t) represent the number of legitimate peers in the P2P network at time t.
Therefore, H(t) + I(t) = n +m and H(0) = n. Let the probability of each peer to
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perform a download at time slot t be p. Then, the total number of downloads in a
time slot are (n+m)  p. The probability of downloading from peer carrying a virus
at time slot t is (t), where (0) = I(0)=(n+m). Let r the probability of requesting
a malicious le of peer r at time slot t is q(r; t). The total number of les in the
network is M , and among them, Mf are infected. Therefore, q(r; t) =
Mf
M
.
The average number of infected peers of a P2P network, without using a trust
management scheme at time t+ 1 can be expressed as:
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
I(t+ 1) = I(t) +
n I(t)X
i=1
p ((1  q(i; t)) I(t)
n+m
+q(i; t))
q(i; t) =
Mf
M
(2.1)
where, 0  I(t)  (n+m).
The probability of downloading a le from a malicious peer by a P2P network
is reduced by using warning messages. Let N(i; t) denote the number of malicious
peers recorded by peer i at time slot t. G(i; t) denotes number of legitimate peers in
the view of peer i at time slot t, and G(i; t) = n+m N(i; t).
Consider that at time slot t, a truster peer of peer i, peer k, downloads an
infected le from peer j, peer k then sends a warning message to its trustees if
the malicious le is detected. Each warning message contains the downloading
information such as name of the le, and the ID of peer j. The average number
of infected peers at time slot t+ 1 can be expressed as
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8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
I(t+ 1) = I(t) +
n I(t)X
i=1
p ((1  q(i; t))
 I(t) N(i; t)
n+m N(i; t) + q(i; t))
N(i; t+ 1) = N(i; t) +
vX
k=1
p ((1  q(k; t))
 I(t) N(k; t)
n+m N(k; t) + q(k; t))
q(i; t) =
Mf
M
(2.2)
where, 0 < N(i; t) < I(t) < (n+m).
Since N(i; t) > 0, I(t)
n+m
> p(I(t) N(i;t))
n+m N(i;t) . Therefore, the proposed trust
management scheme reduces the growth rate of the number of malicious peers in
the network.
When le reputation (FR) is used in DDT scheme, F (i; t) denotes the number
of malicious peers recorded by peer i at time slot t. The average number of infected
peers can be expressed as:
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
I(t+ 1) = I(t) +
n I(t)X
i=1
p ((1  q(i; t))
 I(t) N(i; t)
n+m N(i; t) + q(i; t))
N(i; t+ 1) = N(i; t) +
vX
k=1
p ((1  q(k; t))
 I(t) N(k; t)
n+m N(k; t) + q(k; t))
q(i; t) =
Mf   F (i; t)
M
F (i; t+ 1) = F (i; t) +
vX
k=1
p ((1  q(k; t))
 I(t) N(k; t)
n+m N(k; t) + q(k; t))
(2.3)
where 0 < F (i; t) < Mf , and 0 < N(i; t) < I(t) < (n+m).
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Compared to the DDT scheme,
Mf F (i;t)
M
<
Mf F (i;t)
M
and therefore, the average
number of infected peers in the DDT scheme with FR is smaller than that of using
the DDT scheme alone.
2.2.1 Simulation Study of the DDT Scheme with and without Warning
Messaging
A P2P network is modeled with 100 peers, and three malicious peers. The total
number of les is 150, and 10 of them are viruses. The downloading probability p is
0:2. 10 peers are randomly selected as the number of trustees for each peer as initial
condition. In Figure 2.5, NTM indicates the performance of DDT with no propagated
messages and no trust management scheme. From this Figure, it is shown that the
DDT scheme, combined with le reputation, limits the number of infected peers in
30 peers within 30 time slots.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
20
40
60
80
100
Time slots
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
in
fe
ct
ed
 p
ee
rs
NTM
DDT 
DDT+FR
Figure 2.5 Theoretical estimation of proliferation of viruses in DDT, DDT+FR,
and without a trust management scheme, NTM.
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2.3 Performance
A P2P network is simulated using a mesh topology, with 100 peers randomly placed
as active peers in the mesh. An active peer is a host that forwards, stores, or requests
les to or from the other peers. The network has 150 existing les with several copies
for each le. Files (and copies) are distributed randomly with a uniform distribution
among peers. From these les, 60% of them are set as popular les (i.e., requested
with high frequency). Among all les, 10 randomly selected les are designated as
malware (i.e., virus). After a host downloads a malicious le, there is a probability
of detecting it, which is denoted as Pd. Here, it is considered that the minimum time
for an event (e.g., a download or a transmission of an alert from one peer to another
in the network) is a xed amount of time or time slot. The total number of infected
peers are evaluated at each time slot.
Figure 2.6 shows the performance of the DTM scheme measured in the number
of infected peers, where only a trust value per peer is used. In this scheme, the trust
value of a peer is evaluated by considering the recorded downloads of a truster from
its trustees. This Figure also considers when downloading a le and the broadcasting
peers' trust values to trusters, and PI = 0. The Figure shows two curves, one with
Pd = 0:5, and Pd = 0:25. Because the number of infected peers changes signicantly
from time slot to time slot, the curve for Pd = 0:25 converges to 70 infected peers after
20 time slots, while the curve for Pd = 0:5 converges to 50 peers after the same time.
This shows that the management scheme cannot bound the malware proliferation
eciently.
This Figure shows the performance of the DTM scheme with PI = 0:0 in a
network. This Figure shows that for peers with antivirus software with, Pd = 0:5,
the number of infected peers is 45 after a long period of time (or until the number
of downloads reaches 800), and for Pd = 0:25, the maximum number of infected
peers approaches 70 after 750 downloads. These results show that the delay
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Figure 2.6 Proliferation of malware using Tv and Pd = f0:25; 0:5g, with no local
infection and alert delay.
on disseminating the alert messages allows more high-risk downloads, allows the
proliferation of malware.
Figure 2.7 shows the proliferation of the DTM scheme, as in the two cases
above but, however, with infection probability (PI = 0; 0:25; 0:5). This case considers
no propagation delay for the alert system, and Pd = 0:5. This Figure shows that
the infection property of viruses increase the eectiveness of malware proliferation,
and even with Pd = 0:5, all peers in the network would end up infected after 1200
downloads.
Figure 2.8 shows the degree of proliferation of malware using the DTM scheme
and the proposed DDT scheme, where Iv is used, under Pd = 0:5 with no propagation
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Figure 2.7 Proliferation of malware using DTM scheme, with Pd = 0:5 and
considering infection probability PI > 0.
delay in the distribution of the alert messages. This gure shows the spreading of
viruses in the number of infected hosts per time slots. In this Figure, the performance
of the DTM scheme decreases as the PI increases. On the other hand, with the
proposed DDT scheme, the impact of the infection probability is also noticeable but
this impact is signicantly lower, making the proposed scheme more eective.
These results are also shown in terms of the number of downloads. Figure 2.9
shows the proliferation of malware using the DTM scheme and the DDT scheme under
Pd = 0:5 with propagation delays for the alert messages. The curves for dierent PI ,
as in Figure 2.8, show a similar performance. The proposed scheme bounds it. In
the case of a high PI value, or PI = 0:5, the number of infected peers drops from 100
peers as in the case of the DTM scheme to close to 30 peers in the DDT scheme.
Figure 2.10 shows the performance of both the DTM and the proposed
schemes, measured as the number of infected peers per number of downloads in the
network under dierent PI values in an infectious environment. The proposed trust
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Figure 2.8 Proliferation of malware using the proposed DDT scheme with Pd = 0:5
and dierent PI values in time slots.
management scheme uses le reputation, labeled FR in the Figure, with and without
Iv. Curves a) to d) show that infectious viruses inhibit the eectivity of the DTM
scheme as all peers in the network eventually get infected. This occurs because peers
may be isolated after viruses have infected some peers. Curves e) to h) show that
when le reputation is used, without recurring to Iv, the number of infected peers
is bounded as the number of infected les is smaller than the total number of peers
in the network. The proliferation is bounded because a peer can now identify a le
coming from a peer with a record of no infections, in a proactive way. Curves i) to l)
show that the use of a le reputation value in combination with Iv, which is updated
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Figure 2.9 Proliferation of malware using the proposed DDT with Pd = 0:5 and
dierent PI values.
based on warning messages among peers, has the highest performance as the number
of infected peers decreases to an average of 10. The warning messages then are also
used to identify peers with trustable values but that may contain infected les. This
is shown under the highest PI values, PI = 0:9, as the number of infected peers of l)
is smaller than those of h).
Increasing the number of trust parameters in the management systems creates
the risk of discouraging the download activity. The download activity of the network
is evaluated using the same conditions as above. Figure 2.11 shows the download
activity of a network using the DDT scheme, in downloads per time slot. The results
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Figure 2.10 Comparison of proliferation of viruses using Tv only and with the
proposed scheme.
show that the download activity with dierent PI values, which impacts Iv for each
peer, has no signicant changes. This means that the proposed approach does not
discourage network activity.
2.4 Conclusions
Trust management is a promising strategy to bound the proliferation of malware on
peer-to-peer networks that can work jointly with virus detection systems. In this
paper, it is showed that the use of a single trust value per peer has deciencies in
bounding the proliferation of malware. In most cases, it is highly probable that the
majority of peers become infected. By using extra information, based on the infectious
value, where the consideration of a peer having hosted an infected le, the proliferation
of malware becomes bounded more eectively. By using computer simulation of a
mesh peer-to-peer network, the improvement of this proposed approach has been
shown. Furthermore, considering that trust parameters to bound proliferation have
the potential of discouraging download activity in P2P networks, the impact of using
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Figure 2.11 Download activity of the network using the proposed DDT scheme.
the proposed DDT scheme is studied. It is showed that the approach has little impact
on the download activity of the network.
CHAPTER 3
THREE DIMENSIONAL TRUST MANAGEMENT SCHEME IN
PEER TO PEER NETWORK
The calculation and aggregation of the local trust values in distributed environment
is challenging and crucial in successfully designing a trust management scheme. Most
existing trust management schemes normalize the trust value before further process.
However, there can be some drawbacks in some normalizations. Especially, in the case
where the attacker may utilize the normalization in ratio based trust management
scheme to attack the system. The attacker can oer a high quality download resource
in the rst iteration to obtain a high trust from the receiver. After that, it can
take advantage of the high trust value obtained to be regarded with a priority in the
following iterations.
A ratio based trust management scheme is fragile under such kind of attacks.
In this chapter, a novel normalization of trust values is proposed.
3.1 Trust Value Normalization
In a distributed environment, peers rate each other after each transaction. For
example, in Eigentrust [20], peer i may rate a download as negative if the le
downloaded is inauthentic, malicious, or tampered. Each peer i stores the number
satisfactory transactions it has had with peer j, sat(i; j) and the number of
unsatisfactory transactions it has had with peer j, unsat(i; j). To aggregate local
trust values, Eigentrust used a normalized local trust value cij with the following
format: cij =
SijP
Sij
, where Sij is dened as Sij = sat(i; j)  unsat(i; j) and
P
Sij is
the number of dierential transactions of peer i with all other peers it has interacted.
Through the normalization procedure, all values are bounded between 0 and 1. All
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previous works in P2P reputation systems check these references and cite well
[1, 8] have all been based on similar notions of local trust values. In dynamic trust
[17], the local trust value is calculated as cij =
SijP
Sij
. It is observed that all above
trust value normalized is obtained through the ratio calculation.
However, there are some drawbacks to normalize in these manners. These cij
values are relative, and there is no absolute interpretation. Such as, if cij = cik, peer
j has the same reputation as peer k as seen by peer i, but don't know if both of
them are very reputable, or if both of them are mediocre. The reputed peer and the
mediocre peer may have the same trust value. For example, consider that sat(i; j) =
1; total(i; j) = 1, and sat(i; k) = 10000; total(i; k) = 1000, which leads to cij =
1
1
=
1andcik =
10000
10000
= 1 by calculating cik = fracsatised transactionstotal transactions.
As seen by peer i, the trust value of cij and cik are equal, but it is unfair to peer k
since the total number of transaction between peer i and peer k is ten thousand times
the total number of transaction between peer i and peer j. Hence, how to calculate
and aggregate the local trust values cij in a distributed environment is challenging
and crucial to successfully design a trust management scheme.
3.2 3D Trust Value Normalization
In this section, a new trust value normalization scheme is proposed. Dierent from
the ratio calculation, the calculation is based on the ideas of closeness, used mainly
in studying the behavior of functions close to values at which they are undened.
For example, the function y =  

x , where 0 <  < 1 and  > 1 , is close to 1
with the increasing of variable x. Here,  and  are two parameters that control the
approaching speed to 1. For example, Figure 3.1 shows four functions with dierent
 value, y = e 
1
x ; y = e 
5
x ; y = e 
10
x ; y = e 
50
x . From Figure 3.1, the approaching
speed to 1 is reduces from the red line to the green line.
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Figure 3.1 Functions with four dierent  values
Based on y =   
x
, the y-axis is the spinning axle and x-axis as the base. After
a 360-degree rotation, a three-dimensional surface is obtained. Figure 3.2 shows the
surface of the three-dimension function spun from y = e  5
x
and y = e 
50
x . The surface
of the rst function approaches to its closing limit 1 faster than the second one. Figure
3.2 provides us a view to the surfaces from dierent angles.
A questions arises: how to express the three-dimensional surface? If the surface
is cut vertically from the top, Figure 3(a) displays a vertical cross section of the
three-dimension function. The line in Figure 3.3(a) can be expressed as:
z =  

r (3.1)
Considering the choosing of a point in the line randomly, where a perpendicular
line to the base is drawn, a point A is got shown in Figure 3.3(a). From Figure 3.3(b),
x-intercept of point A, y-intercept of point A and r compose a right-angle triangle.
According to the Pythagorean Theorem, r =
p
x2 + y2 is obtained. r =
p
x2 + y2 is
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Figure 3.2 Surfaces of the three-dimensional functions.
substituted for r in equation 3.1, and to get it to express a three-dimensional surface
z = 
  p
x2+y2 . According to this transformation, the surfaces in Figure 3.2 can be
expressed as z = e
  5p
x2+y2 and z = e
  50p
x2+y2 , separately.
To calculate the trust value, sat(i; j) and tol(i; j) are used as the input variables
x and y. the local trust value is dened as:
cij = 
  p
sat(i;j)2+tol(i;j)2 (3.2)
The local trust values is normalized in this manner because it models the
trust value aggregation fairly and can reect the real transition history accurately.
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Figure 3.3 The mapping of two dimensions to three dimensions.
Moreover, the boundary of the trust function is between 0 and 1. Hence, the
advantages of the previous schemes obtained through trust value normalization are
maximally preserved in the new scheme. Nevertheless, the proposed scheme has some
new features. First, the trust value is not only related to the proportion of satised
transactions but also the total number of transaction history. Second, the model is
more exible since dierent approaching speed through control  and  is adjusted.
For example, in the startup period, a small slope is chosen to control the increase
speed of the trust value, if a peer constantly provides satisfactory transactions, in the
near future, a larger slope which means quicker approaching speed to 1, can be given
to the corresponding peer. Through the three dimension trust value management,
peers have more exibility to control the trust value calculation.
3.3 Performance and Results
A P2P network using a mesh topology is simulated, with 100 peers selected randomly
as active peers in the mesh. In the beginning, the peers do not know each other.
The trust relationship is built through the downloading interactions. There are two
trust-value calculation schemes in the trust model. One is a ratio based trust model
and the other is a 3D-based trust model. The robustness of the system is shown
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by observing the number of peers infected. In the trust model, the attacker joins
the system from the third time slot. The attack contains some clean les and some
infected les or viruses. A peer will download from a stranger peer if and only if he
can not nd the downloading source anywhere else. There are 150 les in the mesh
network. Among them, twenty percent are popular les. To reveal the eect of the
attacker to the network, there are 10 les owned by the attacker only.
Figure 3.4 shows the performance of the ratio-based scheme and the 3D-based
scheme with dierent local virus detection probability, PD = 0:25; 0:5. From this
Figure, after the attacker joins the network, the performance of the ratio based scheme
degrades quickly. After 1400 downloads, almost all peers are infected. The attacker
successfully subverts the system throughout. However, the infection is just partially
controlled with the 3D-based scheme.
Figure 3.5 shows the eect of internal infection PI = 0; 0:25; 0:5.The system
performance degrades quickly with the increase of PI . This case also considers no
propagation delay for the alert system and Pd = 0:5. These results are also shown in
terms of the number of downloads.
In Figure 3.6, the total number of infected peers after each time slot is evaluated.
This Figure shows the spreading of the malware in number of infected hosts per time
slot. The curves for dierent PI in the Figure show a similar performance, as in Figure
3.5. Compared to the ratio-based scheme, the 3D-based scheme not only inhibits the
proliferation of malware but also bounds it.
In the end, the download activity of the network using the same conditions as
above is evaluated. Figure 3.7 shows the download activity of a network using the
3D based scheme, in downloads per time slot. The results show that the download
activity with dierent PI values has no signicant changes. This means that the
proposed approach does not discourage network activity.
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Figure 3.4 Comparison of the ratio-based scheme and the 3D-based scheme, under
PD = f0:25; 0:5g, with no local infection and alert delay.
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Figure 3.5 Comparison of the ratio-based scheme and the 3D-based scheme, under
PD = 0:5; PI = f0; 0:25; 0:5g, with no local infection and alert delay
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Figure 3.6 Comparison of the ratio-based Scheme and the 3D-based scheme, under
PD = 0:5; PI = f0; 0:25; 0:5g, with no local infection and alert delay.
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Figure 3.7 Download activity of the network using the 3D-based scheme.
CHAPTER 4
SYBILDEFENSE: DEFENSE OF A TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
IN A P2P NETWORK AGAINST A SYBIL ATTACK
Trust management schemes have been used as proactive mechanisms to prevent virus
dissemination in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks [20, 17, 95]. Current trust models are
based on evaluating peer reputation as experienced by interacting peers. Reputation
can be also applied to the objects exchanged between peers. A system that uses
object reputation computes and publishes the reputation scores of the set of objects
(e.g. service providers, services, goods or entities) in a P2P community. In these
approaches, the peer reputation is set as reputation scores, which are computed using
the opinions that peers hold about the objects [22]- [18]. The reputation scores are
used by peers to decide whether or not to acquire the object. An object with a high
reputation score becomes more attractive than one with a low reputation score.
A reputation system can be classied as synchronous or asynchronous. In
synchronous reputation systems, like EigenTrust [20], the trust value is calculated
by considering the values estimated by all the peers in the network. Trusted peers
are built through the propagation of all reputation values. An identity's reputation
depends solely on the topology of the trust table. In asynchronous reputation system,
reputation for each peer is calculated locally and independent of any other. Each
entity separately computes a trust value along their unique paths to every other
identity in the system.
However, peer reputation may not be able to limit the proliferation of viruses in
a network under sybil attacks because the reputation system is the one under attack.
In a sybil attack, a sybil peer impersonates a larger number of peers by using stolen
and/or non-existing identities. For example, in a P2P network, new identities can be
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easily created as users are not tied to unique identiers. Sybil peers take advantage
of this and create multiple identities to falsely to support and inate the reputation
of the fake identities. In this way, a single peer may create a number of sybil peers
for its own benet [24]. A peer with a high reputation can obtain more benets from
a cooperative system with a smaller contribution to the network than those of other
users. Hence, a sybil attack can potentially defeat trust-based management schemes.
The existing defense schemes against sybil attacks consider dierent tradeos and
most of them are not capable of defending against all the dierent sybil attacks
[22, 24, 20].
Synchronous reputation systems have been shown vulnerable to sybil attacks
[24]. In such systems, an attacker creates sybil identities, as impersonated peers, to
create a copy of a graph of existing (trusting) relationships and playing the role of
honest peers to increase its own reputation. In this graph, the original peers cannot
be distinguished from the impersonated peers. Thus, sybil peers acquire reputations
equal to or better than that of a honest peer, and the system is subverted in the end.
Asynchronous reputation systems are more robust to sybil attacks, because no sybil
attacker can create a duplicate global graph as explained above for the synchronous
system case. This trust value can change over time as the entity interacts with and
observes the behavior of dierent identities.
This chapter proposes a framework to bound proliferation of viruses or malware
in P2P networks under sybil attacks. Within this framework, a set of necessary
conditions are proposed for a trust management scheme needs to follow to defend
against sybil attacks. It is shown that several of the previously proposed methods
[28],[20] can be eective as they satisfy the proposed conditions. The framework
is based in three dierent defense mechanisms: 1) a local trust table, where are
peer records the dierent trust values, one per peer, 2) a k-means mechanism to
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dierentiate honest from sybil peers, and 3) a transaction verication scheme to verify
reported interactions by all peers.
As part of the transaction verication scheme, a cryptographic trust model is
proposed, called sybil defense framework (SDF). Furthermore, the k-means clustering
mechanism is it used to identify sybil peers without recurring to threshold based
schemes [17], [20], as it is well known that selecting a threshold value is complex.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 states the
model of sybil attack and gives a theoretic formulation of sybil attack under reputation
system. Section 4.2 proposes the sybil defense network model assumptions. Section
4.3 introduces the downloading process of the sybil defense algorithm with transaction
verication and k-mean clustering scheme in detail. Section 4.4 introduces the trust
management model. Section 4.5 shows the performance results obtained through
computer simulation. Section 4.6 presents the conclusions.
4.1 Problem Statement
A sybil peer creates a number of virtual peers or pseudonyms (sybils) who behave
in the system as separate peers, vouching for each other to articially increase the
reputation of a single or a few sybil peers. By using multiple identities, the adversary
attempts to control the trust that other peers observe on it. A sybil attack is a
mechanism for the attacking peer to get more benets from a cooperative system
than other users, without contributing to the community.
In this section, the sybil attack model is introduced and illustrated, how a sybil
attack can signicantly impact the trust management system of the P2P network.
4.1.1 Sybil Attack Model
The sybil attack in this chapter is an attack where one or several peers attempt
to subvert the network by forging identities that can help to manipulate the trust
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management system. The trust management system is used to rank the level of trust
of peers as experienced by interacting peers.
The vulnerability of a trust management system under a sybil attack is
determined by how eectively sybils can aect the system, while using strategies
to countermeasure attacks and treating all peers without distinction (i.e., fairly).
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Figure 4.1 Sybil attack.
Figure 4.1(a) shows an distributed and asynchronous trust-management system.
In a distributed and asynchronous system there is neither a centralized directory nor
any control over the system topology or resource placement. When a new peer joins
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the system, it forms connections with other peers freely. In this network, a peer that
is trusted by peer i, where 1  i  N , is called trustee of peer i, and a peer that
trusts peer i is called truster. Peer i has a trust table, which is denoted as T (i). The
trust value of peer i on peer j is denoted as Tv(i; j), which is equal to the number of
virus-free downloads divided by total number of downloads. A peer sends messages
to its trustees to share the experienced downloading interactions. The information
on these messages is used by the trustees to compute trust values about some other
peers.
When peer i completes a download from peer k, if the download is determined
uninfected, peer i sends a message to its trustees with a positive rating. This is
called a positive rating message.Otherwise, peer i issues a negative rating message.
After receiving the message, peer j, which is the trustee of peer i, calculates the
propagated value Pv(j; k). Pv(j; k) is average of the propagated ratings about peer k.
Peer j accepts rating messages only from its trusters. Each peer calculates its trust
value and propagated value from its downloading history and the message propagated
from its trustees timely. There is no central server in this network and each peer is
independent and processes information locally.
Two dierent models of sybil attacks are identied. The rst one occurs when
sybil peers attempt to inate the trust value of a single or multiple sybil peers who
does not provide actual contribution to the network, with the objective of constructing
a high reputation of sybil peers and, therefore, making them attractive for honest
peers. In the second attack model, sybil peers attempt to defame one or multiple
honest peers through the issuing of messages carrying low scores or (negative) rating
messages. An eective attack would then decrease the trust value of the target peers
(peers receiving the messages and those being defamed are all victim peers).
Figure 4.1 also shows an example of how a sybil peer can bias the selection
of interacting peers for honest peers. There are eight peers in this Figure, where
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the dark colored peers represent the trustees of peer A. The darker the color is, the
stronger relationship between A and its trustees. Figure 4.1(a) shows that peers B,
C, D, E, F, G, and H are trustees of peer A.
The sybil peers may take advantage of the ranting messaging process to gain a
high reputation or depreciate reputation of a honest peer. As shown in Figure 4.1(b),
sybil peers marked with s broadcast the rating messages to the network. Figure4.1(c)
shows the one result of successful attacking. The trust value of peer A on peer B
is decreased. Peer B is excluded from the trustee set of peer A. Figure4.1(d) shows
another result of successful attacking. One sybil peer becomes trustee of peer A and
its rank is improved by sybil strategy.
4.1.2 Model of Sybil Attack on a Trust Management System
Proof against a sybil attack has been formulated using a static graph of trust
management to establish the required necessary conditions [24]. In this section, a
theoretical analysis of a trust management scheme is introduced to explore necessary
conditions for making this scheme immune to sybil attacks. A discrete time, where
each event has a xed duration or time slot, is considered in the following discussion.
In the following discussion, it is considered that each event in the P2P network,
such as a download, the sending of a rating message, or the search for a le or peer,
takes a constant unit of time, called time slot.
Consider a network using a trust management system with n honest peers and
s sybil peers, each honest peer has m trusters in average and each sybil peer has r
replications (i.e., sybil peers). Total number of peers in the network is n+ s+ s  r.
Let I(t) represent the number of infected peers (i.e., honest that have downloaded a
le carrying a virus such that all les uploaded by the peer may also carry the virus)
in the P2P network at time t. Let T (t) represent the number of honest peers in the
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P2P network at time t, T (t) + I(t) = n + s + s  r. The probability that each peer
performs a download at the tth time slot is p.
In this case, the total number of downloads in a time slot is (n+ s+ s  r)  p.
The probability that a downloading is performed from a sybil peer at time t is t,
and 0 = I(0)=(n+ s+ s  r), where I(0) = s+ s  r.
Let N(i; t) denote the number of sybil peers recorded by peer i at time t, and
let G(i; t) denote the number of honest peers as determined by peer i at time t, and
G(i; t) = n+ s+ s  r  N(i; t).
Now, consider that at time t, a truster (peer k) of peer i downloads an infected
le from peer q. If the downloaded le is detected infected, peer k sends a rating
message to its trustees. Each rating message contains the download information,
such as name of the le, the download time, and the ID of peer q. 
(k; t) represents
the average value for each peer calculate from those values in the issued rating
message. A large 
(k; t) means more information is obtained by the propagated
rating messages. With this information, peer i can quarantine identied or suspicious
peers more eciently.
For a distributed P2P network, the average number of infected peers at time
t+ 1 can be expressed as8>>>><>>>>:
I(t+ 1) = I(t) +
n I(t)X
i=1
p  (I(t) N(i; t))
n+ s+ s  r  N(i; t)
N(i; t+ 1) = N(i; t) +
mX
k=1
p  (I(t) N(i; t))  
(k; t)
n+ s+ s  r  N(k; t)
(4.1)
where, 0 < N(i; t) < I(t) < (n+ s+ s  r).
Therefore, the eectivity of of this mechanism depends on 
(k; t). A
conventional trust management scheme quarantines a sybil peer at a time, which
means that each propagated rating message carries information about a sybil peer,
and 
 = 1 (DTM scheme [?]). The Sybildefense framework uses a k-means clustering
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algorithm and advertisement of rating messages, which carries information about a
possible sybil peer q and its trustees. Hence, the information content in each message
is 
 = r, where r > 1. When r is a large value, the Sybildefense scheme identies
sybil peers accurately and in a short time.
The number of compromised peers in a network is evaluated with 200 peers,
two sybils, and each sybil has ve replications. The downloading probability p is 0:5.
The average number of trustees for each peer is 10.
Figure 4.2 gives I(t) for dierent 
s, estimated with 
 = f0; 1; 10; 80g to 80,
and N(i; t) = 0 (
 = 0), which means no rating messaging. As shown in Figure4.2,
the number of infected peers decreases as 
 increases. To increase Omega, statistics
can be collected (and estimated) for longer periods of time. As the Figure shows,
with 
 = 0, or no rating messages, all the peers get infected quickly.
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Figure 4.2 Number of infected peers under sybil attack.
The above analysis shows that an ecient and timely distribution of information
about sybil peers and les are necessary and sucient conditions to banish the eect
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erent 
s.
of a sybil attack in a dynamic trust management scheme under discrete time. In
section 4.2 discusses how to increase 
 by using the proposed framework.
4.2 Clustering of Sybil Peers
A characteristic of sybil attacks is the duplication of peer identities, as discussed
before. In general, most sybil peers do not have a large trust value within the set of
honest peers right after the sybil peers have been created. As the objective of the
sybil peers is to raise their trust values, they may prevent to interact (or report a high
interaction rate) and this produces a strong connectivity among sybil peers, creating
a sybil cluster. This feature is then used in this dissertation for sybil identication.
A network is represented as a weighted directed graph G = (V;E), with peers
represented by graph peers V , and trust relationship between a pair of peers i; j 2 V
represented as directed edges e 2 E between i and j. In this paper, e(i; j) indicates
that the edge is directed from peer i to peer j. Peer j is called a truster of peer i, and
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peer i is said to be a trustee of peer j. Edges have dierent weights, and the weight of
e(i; j) is equal to the trust value of peer i about peer j, Tv(i; j). Note that an existing
edge indicates strong trust, as edges are considered existing only if e(i; j) > 0.
The set of edges inter-connecting honest peers a cluster of honest peers are
dened. In similar way, the set of edges connecting sybil peers dene a cluster of
sybil peers. The links connecting a honest cluster to a sybil cluster are called attack
edges. An edge may exist between a sybil peer and a honest peer if a honest peer
decides to download a le from an sybil peer. As shown in Figure 4.4, the central
cluster represents the honest-peer cluster. The three clusters around the central
cluster represent three sybil-peer clusters. The rst and the third sybil cluster have
two attack edges to the honest-peer cluster. The second sybil-peer cluster has one
attack edge to the honest-peer cluster.
Honest nodes
Sybil cluster I
Sybil cluster II
Sybil cluster III
Figure 4.4 P2P network with three sybil clusters.
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To gain inuence over the P2P network, sybil peers aim to increase the
number of attack edges. However, setting an edge might take time and be dicult.
Therefore, it is considered that the feasible number of attack edges that can be built
is small. Let F (i) denote the set of trusters of peer i, and let FJ(i; j) denote
the set of peers that are common set trusters of both peer i and j. Therefore,
FJ(i; j) = F (i) \ F (j). FM(i) represent the trusters as a 1  N matrix in peer
i, as FM(i) = fFM(i; 1); : : : ; FM(i; N)g, where FM(i; j) = 1 if peer j is a
truster of peer i and FM(i; j) = 0, otherwise. The total number of trusters of
peer i is TN [F (i)] =
PN
j=1 FM(i; j). If (FM(i)(j) + FM(k)(j)) = 2, (j) = 1,
otherwise (j) = 0. The total number of common trusters between peer i and peer k
is TN [FJ(i; j)] =
PN
j=1 (j).
Figure 4.5 shows a sybil cluster I of Figure 4.4. The Figure shows six sybil
peers. To raise the reputation of the pseudo peers in sybil clusters, the sybil peers
create high trust values for each other, and exchange this information. As a result,
the peers are almost fully connected.
A
Sybil cluster I
B
Sybil cluster I Sybil cluster I
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.5 Trusters' overlap in sybil cluster.
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The yellow peers in Figure 4.5(a) are the trustees of peer A, or F (A), and
TN [F (A)] = 4. The red peers in Figure 4.5(b) are the trustees of peer B, or F (B),
and TN [F (B)] = 4. Figure 4.5 shows the overlap of the trustees of peer A and B,
FJ(A;B) and TN [FJ(A;B)] = 3. In the future, if peer D claims to the system its
trustees and it is found that some of the trustees are among the green peers FJ(A;B)
and TN [FJ(A;B;D)] > TNthres, it is said that this peer is considered as sybil peers
with higher probability, where TNthres represents the threshold that determines a
peer as a sybil. When the number of peers common to peer D and FJ(A;B) is larger
than this threshold, peer D is labeled as sybil. From this, it is seen that, the trusters
between dierent sybil peers usually have many common trusters. The clustering
algorithm relies on this property to identify possible sybil peers.
In the proposed Sybildefense framework, each peer has a local table (i.e.,
database) to store the list of trusters to be marked as possible sibyls peers, so they
can be avoided. For peer i, peer j is viewed as a sybil if peer j provide an incomplete
or a le with malware to peer i (or to one of its trusters peer k).
F (j) is stored in the local table of peer i, with the format shown in Figure .
Here, wins is the size of the time window in which the rating messages are considered
for determination of possible sybils, and N is the total number of peers in the network.
The rst row is the peer IDs. The last two columns, columns j and k, indicate that
the message is sent from peer j to peer k. When j = i, it means that it is the local
downloading experiences, and F (k) is marked in local database as Tv(i; k)  FM(k).
If j 6= i, the rating message is sent from j to i pointing to k and the local database is
updated as Tv(i; j) Tv(j; k) FM(k). In the future, peer i will avoid to downloading
les from peers whose local database value is larger than a threshold TNthres. In this
example, if TNthres = 3, peer (N   2); (N   1) and N is quarantined of being the
downloading source.
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Figure 4.6 Local database calculation.
4.3 Verication of Reported Transactions
In the trust management system, peer i sends a feedback about the latest transaction
to its trustees after each download. Sybil peers recur to this method to post feedbacks
among other sybils to increase their reputation and make them attractive to honest
peers. However, sybil peers report not-occurred transactions as their objective is to
increase their trust values without contributing to the P2P community.
Therefore, a countermeasure against inating peer reputation is proposed. The
scheme is based on providing verication of the reported transactions. In Sybildefense,
it is considered not only the reputation and rating messages but also the set of the
trustees of each peer as that may dene the nature and risks for a peer.
54
Consider that peer i has a public key and a private key, namely, < PKi; RKi >,
respectively. It is assumed that the public keys are tied to peers using digital
certication authorities. Before peer i downloads le f from peer j, peer j sends
a transaction guarantee certicate to peer i. This transaction guarantee can be
expressed as:
TG(j; i) = PKifRKjftime; fgg
where the symbol ajjb represents the concatenation of a and b. A rating message sent
by peer i is accepted by peer j if and only if TG(j; i) is also provided.
By using TG, sybil peers can not issue rating messages with forged ratings to
the network.
The basis of this scheme is to generate a proof of an occurred transaction
between peers i and j if and only if i and j in fact experienced a transaction with each
other. If so, the transaction proof is sent from peer i to peer j after each download.
The transaction proof, TP (i; j), is dened as:
TP (i; j) = PKjfRKifd; time; f; TG(j; i)gg: (4.2)
where d is the description of a transactions, as satisfying or not satisfying, or 0 and
1, respectively. TG(j; i) is embedded in TP (i; j). With TG, peer j is able to prove
that it actually uploaded f to peer i at time slot t. By using TP (i; j), forged ratings
can be avoided. The forged references remain between sybil peers.
4.4 Trust Management Scheme: Trust Values
The considered P2P network has n peers and s sybil peers. Each sybil peer has
r replication peers, which can attack honest peers through collaboratively forged
ratings. Each peer has three tables to maintain, trust table, propagated table and
local database. Each peer generates a public/private key part and distributes the
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public key. When a peer looks for a downloading source, the peer will make decision
by the three tables to choose the downloading source. It is assumed that le identities
remain unchanged for long periods of time.
The trust table in peer i is denoted as T (i). The trust value of peer i on peer
j, is denoted as Tv(i; j),
Tv(i; j) =
number of satisfying downloads
total number of downloads
(4.3)
where Tv(i; j) 2 [0; 1]. For example, Tv(i; j) = 0 means that peer i expects that any
led downloaded from j would be infected with probability 1:0. On the other hand
Tv(i; j) = 1 means that peer i trusts peer j and any le downloaded from j is expected
to be innocuous with probability 1:0. Therefore, peer j has top priority to become
the downloading source. Peer i updates Tv(i; j) in its trust table after downloading a
le from peer j, according to the experienced download.
The second value in the trust table is the propagated value Pv(i; j), is calculated
from the opinions of trusters of peer i on peer j received through rating messages.
Pv(i; j) =
number of positive propagated ratings ratings
total number of propagated ratings
(4.4)
where Pv(i; j) 2 [0; 1]. A positive rating is identied by a value 1, and a negative
rating by a value of 0. A small Pv(i; j) means a large probability that peer j is a sybil
peer. The propagated ratings come from the local download history of those trusters.
The total number of propagated ratings include both positive and negative ratings.
When peer i seeks f , it chooses a download source from one of the trusters
that owns f . A conventional scheme selects the truster a peer whose Tv(i; j) is larger
than trust-value threshold th as the le source. As shown in Figure 4.7(a), the six
peers above the slope are the trusters. However, two issues arise: 1) the users need to
select a threshold value th for the management scheme and 2) the classication is not
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accurate sometimes. To understand the latter issue, consider Figure 4.7(a), the grey
circles correspond to ve sybils peers and the light circles 11 honest peers. By using
linear comparison, one misclassies two sybils and seven honest individuals (circled
in Figure 4.7(b)).
To correct this problem, the k-means clustering algorithm [55] is used with
Tv(i; j) and Pv(i; j) as the x and y axis to group the peers. The red dotted line in
Figure 4.7(a) is mapped to the vertical line in Figure 4.7(b). In general, the k-means
clustering algorithm aims to partition n observations into k clusters in which each
observation belongs to the cluster with the nearest mean. Given a set of observations
(x1; x2; : : : ; xn), where each observation is a d-dimensional vector, the k-means
clustering algorithm aims to partition the n observations into k sets (k  n), S =
S1; S2; : : : ; Sk so as to minimize the sum of squares within a cluster :
argSmin
kX
i=0
X
xi2Si
k (xi   j) k (4.5)
where i is the mean of points in Si. In the proposed algorithm, k is equal to 2, in
other words, two clusters are generated. Figure 4.7(b) shows the result of classication
by the k-mean clustering algorithm.
Each peer tries to identify the honest-peer cluster and the sybil-peer cluster,
each time slot. When peer i request le f , it will send request to the whole network
with its private key as following:
RKifi; f; rtg: (4.6)
where rt is the request time, which is the time the request for a le/download is
issue. After receiving the request, the peers are able to encrypt the messages with
the public key of peer i. The honest peers that have f send feedback information to
peer i, including the trustee list and TP associated to the trustee list as a negative
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Figure 4.7 K-means clustering on truster classication.
rating message. After receiving the feedbacks, peer i eliminate from its candidates
the peers who are not in its truster list. Peer i also eliminate as candidates those
peers whose trustees are identied as possible sybils through the local table.
Peer i then chooses peer j who has the highest sum of squared values, T 2v (i; j)+
P 2v (i; j), as the download source. If peer j agrees to be the downloading source, peer
j sends a transaction guarantee TG(j; i) to peer i, and the upload begins in the next
time slot.
After f is downloaded from peer j, if the download is satisfactory (i.e., a clean
le and complete download), peer i sends a transaction proof TP to peer j, that can
be used in future by peer j to prove its upload contribution to peer i. Simultaneously,
Tv(i; j) is updated and peer i propagates positive rating message to its trustee set,
where the message has the following format:
RKifIDi; IDj; ; TG(j; i)g (4.7)
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where  is the transaction description eld, which indicates whether peer i is satised
with the last download experience by using a ag to indicate either a positive or
negative rating message. Peer k receives a propagated rating message from peer i is
this peer is a truster of peer k, and then it proceeds to update Pv. The propagated
message expires after a specied time, as indicated in the transaction-description eld
of the message. When peer k receives a message has exceed the expiration time slot,
peer k discard the message directly.
After the download, if the download of le f is determined unsatised (e.g.,
detected as malware or the download fails), the transaction proof to peer j is
suppressed and peer i records peer j into its local table and updates Tv(i; j). Peer
i propagates a negative rating message among its trustee list. The format of the
negative rating message is as follows:
RKifIDi; IDj; TG(j; i)g (4.8)
4.5 Performance Analysis
A P2P network is simulated by using a mesh topology, with 200 peers selected
randomly as active peers in the mesh. There are ve dierent groups of sybils clusters
(each contains 11 peers) in the beginning. In the initial status, each honest peer
perform clustering to identify honest peers from possible sybils by using the k-means
clustering algorithm.
Sybil peers attack the network collaboratively. In the simulation, 30% of sybil
peers send rating messages each time slot to raise the reputation of their central peer
and their collaborator sybils. Since the sybil peers can not get transaction proofs TP
from honest peers, each sybil peers randomly select 6 sybil peers from those in their
cluster as their trustees and send forged rating messages to them.
The eectivity of the proposed framework is measured by estimating the number
of peers that become compromised as sybil peers in the network. The simulation
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results, under a large attack rate of 0.8, are shown in Figure 4.8. The attack rate
is the probability that the sybil peers develop attacks, in the form of issuing bogus
rating messages that inate the trust values of other sybil peers, in a time slot. In this
Figure, K indicates the use of the k-means clustering algorithm, T indicates the use
of transaction proof, and L indicates the use of a local table. The Figure shows six
curves, each represents a dierent combination of the Sybildefense mechanism. The
Figure show the eect of using T ,K,L separately, and from these, it can be observed
the transaction verication scheme T is the mechanism that has the major impact
on the eciency of Sybildefense. This is because the eect of the local table and
and k-means clustering schemes are used to determine sybil candidates but it is no
guarantee that they actually are sybils. These two mechanism reduce the probability
of selecting a sybil as a download source. However, the transaction proof mechanism
is a direct countermeasure to the ination of reputation that sybil peers pursue, and
therefore, this mechanism has the largest countermeasure eect.
This Figure also shows that when these three mechanisms are combined, the
eciency of Sybildefense is very high. The results show that the proposed scheme
can suppress the sybil attacks eciently, as the number of honest peers remains at
184, showing that the number of compromised peers is small and it remains at this
value indenitely.
Figure 4.9 shows the same scenarios discussed in Figure 4.8, under, however,
a small rate attack of 0.2. This Figure shows the larger eect of the Sybildefense
mechanisms under this low-intensivity attack.
Figure 4.10 shows the failure ratio of the k-means clustering methods under
local table (L), the transaction (T ), and the combination of the two (L + T ) . The
failure ratio is calculated as the number of sybil peers in the truster list divided by
the total number of trusters. The failure ratio is calculated in the honest peers only
which means that among the two hundred honest peers. From this Figure, it is seen
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Figure 4.8 Comparison of dierent the Sybildefense's mechanisms under attack
rate 0.8.
that with the using of local table and the transaction verication mechanisms, the
ratio false positives is reduced.
4.6 Conclusions
Trust management is a strategy to determine the reputation of peers by determining
the level of trustability. However, trust management alone may not be eciently
determine the level of threat of peers when a network is under sybil attacks, as
these attacks attempt to undermine peer reputations. Therefore, a framework is
proposed for defending peers in a P2P network from sybil attacks to support trust
management schemes. The proposed algorithm guarantees that a P2P network
may not be compromised under sybil attacks. With the proposed framework, an
honest peer can successfully contribute and obtain services other honest peers in the
network. The framework consist of three mechanisms, a local table to determine
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Figure 4.9 Comparison of the dierent Sybildefense's mechanisms under attack
rate of 0.2.
dierent collaborating groups that could identify sybil cluster, a k-means mechanism
to determine which one of the cluster could be a sybil candidate, and a transaction
verication mechanism to undermine bogus transaction reports.
Since the attackers are forced to build up trust before eectively launching
attacks, the algorithm is designed to mitigate the sybils attack in an anonymous and
decentralized fashion.
The presented simulation results show the aectivity of the proposed framework,
which limits the number of compromised peer to a small number.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Trust management is a promising strategy to bound the proliferation of malware on
peer-to-peer networks that can work jointly with virus detection systems. However,
trust management alone can not defense sybil attacks. An asynchronous reputation
system is designed in defending two primary attacking developed by sybil peers. The
proposed algorithm guarantees that an honest peer accepts, and is also accepted by,
most other honest peers with high possibility. An honest peer can successfully obtain
service from and provide service to most other honest peers. This algorithm enables
a peer to partition the peers into two groups, the honest peers groups and sybil peers
groups.
Trust management is a strategy to determine the reputation of peers by
determining the level of trustability. However, trust management alone may not be
eciency determine the level of threat of peers when a network is under sybil attacks,
as these attacks attempt to undermine peer reputations. Therefore, a framework is
proposed for defending peers in a P2P network from sybil attacks to support trust
management schemes. The proposed algorithm guarantees that a P2P network may
not be compromised under sybil attacks. With the proposed Sybildefense framework,
an honest peer can successfully contribute and obtain services other honest peers in
the network. The framework consist of three mechanisms, a local table to determine
dierent collaborating groups that could identify sybil cluster, a k-means mechanism
to determine which one of the cluster could be a sybil candidate, and a transaction
verication mechanism to undermine bogus transaction reports.
Since the attackers are forced to build up trust before eectively launching
attacks. The algorithm is designed to mitigate the sybil attack in an anonymous
63
and decentralized fashion. The presented simulation results show the eectivity of
the proposed framework, which limits the number of compromised peer to a small
number.
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